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of demographic rates, mortality, fertility, and immigration, and shows how these are 
combined to make stochastic forecasts of population number and composition, using 
forecasts of the U.S. population by way of illustration. Next, the paper discusses how 
demographic models and economic models can be combined into an integrated projection 
model of transfer systems such as social security. Finally, the paper shows how these 
integrated models describe various dimensions of policy-relevant risk, and discusses the 
nature and implications of risk in evaluating policy alternatives.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper describes stochastic population forecasts as they relate to the development of 
policies related to government spending on the elderly, mainly in the context of the 
industrialized nations. I begin by discussing methods of using probabilistic forecasts for 
projecting demographic rates, mortality, fertility, and immigration. I show how these are 
combined to make stochastic forecasts of population number and composition, 
illustrating with forecasts of the United States population. Next, I discuss how 
demographic models and economic models can be combined into an integrated projection 
model of transfer systems such as Social Security. I show how these integrated models 
describe various dimensions of policy-relevant risk and discuss the nature and 
implications of risk in evaluating policy alternatives. Finally, I consider briefly the 
distinct issues in the projection of health care spending.  
The background of this paper will be familiar to many readers. United States 
demography in the early 21st century will be shaped first by the aging of the baby 
boomers and then by the sustained increase in human life span that began over a century 
ago. These factors will result in an unprecedented increase in the proportion of people 
who are over 65 years old, starting in about 2010. Since existing public programs for 
pensions and health care are largely paid for by transfers from taxpayers (in the prime 
working ages of 20 to 65) to people over 65, the fiscal cost of these transfers will likely 
have to go up unless there are changes in the benefits paid by these public programs. 
Much the same phenomenon is taking place contemporaneously across the industrialized 
world and will also occur after some decades in most other countries of the world, most 
notably India and China. Research on this topic addresses the possible individual and 
policy responses to these forthcoming demographic changes. At the aggregate level, the 
central quantities of interest are the taxes collected to pay transfers and the size of the 
total transfer paid to the older population. These have two components, per-capita tax and 
transfer rates, and the numbers of taxpayers and recipients. If we focus on the rates, as 
Richard Disney said in his 1996 book, projected fiscal changes have nothing to do with 
demography. If we focus on the second, demography matters. Of course, in the real world 
both matter, as does the interaction between them. In this paper, my primary focus is on   2
demography, but the integrated models discussed here provide a tool for the exploration 
of interactions, as I will illustrate. 
The next section of this paper discusses the determinants of population change 
and the nature of stochastic forecasting models, then considers, in turn, mortality, 
fertility, and migration. Section 3 discusses stochastic population projections for the 
United States and some of their features. Section 4 considers integrated projection models 
that combine economic, policy, and demographic variables, and presents in outline such a 
model for the United States Social Security system. Results from this model are used to 
illustrate and discuss policy analysis in the context of the substantial uncertainty in our 
projections of the future. In particular, I discuss ways in which one constructs and 
analyzes measures of risk. In Section 5, I indicate how the integrated model of Section 4 
can be adapted to address health care costs, and conclude with some reflections on the 
value of these methods.  
Much of the work underlying this paper has been done in collaboration with 
Ronald Lee over the past 15 years. Significant contributions to parts of this effort have 
also been made by Mike Anderson, Carl Boe, and Ryan Edwards. My goal here is to 
present the current state of this work, so the citations are not exhaustive. 
 
2. DEMOGRAPHIC FORECASTS: VITAL RATES 
 
Demographers study and forecast the numbers and composition of populations. It is 
possible to subdivide populations quite finely, for instance by age, sex, ethnicity, 
education, marital status, and household status. But our ability to accurately model the 
dynamics involved decreases as disaggregation increases, so most forecasts only project 
population composition by age and sex. To do this, we require forecasts of age-specific 
and sex-specific vital rates, fertility, mortality, and immigration. Given a launch year, say 
2005, and the population composition in that year, plus projections of all of rates for 
every year in the forecast horizon, the population forecast is simply a book-keeping 
exercise called the cohort-component method. The key to the stochastic forecasting 
approach is that it incorporates the temporal volatility of vital rates and projects these into   3
the future to produce a range of forecasts with associated probabilities. The hard part of 
this is to project the rates. 
 
Mortality 
Mortality rates for large national populations have a characteristic age pattern for ages 
through 85 and the age pattern of mortality at ages between 85 and 110 is now also fairly 
well understood (Thatcher, Kannisto, and Vaupel 1998). To make projections, we want to 
know how the level of mortality falls at all ages, and reliable forecasts are made possible 
by Lee and Carter’s (1992) discovery that mortality rates in the United States have fallen 
at roughly the same age-specific exponential rate over many decades. Lee and Carter’s 
conclusion has been found to apply to virtually every industrial country, starting with the 
G7 countries (Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe 2000), and represents the most striking discovery 
about mortality change in the industrial age. Letting M(x,t) be the central death rate for 
age x in year t, the Lee-Carter model can be written in the form, 
 
log M(x,t) = log M(x,t-1) – z b(x) + E(t).                         (Equation 1) 
 
Here, z is a rate of decline common to every age and b(x) is an age-specific 
response factor that tells us the relative rate of decline specific to age x, and E(t) is a 
residual that is typically small in magnitude. The constancy of the rate of decline in z 
means that mortality falls at a roughly constant exponential rate over time. 
For a forecaster, the Lee-Carter model has the equally important feature that 
deviations around the long-run trend can be effectively modeled using stochastic 
processes. Fitting the model (1) yields residuals E(t) that have no trend but can be 
described by a relatively simple stochastic process. Lee and Carter (1992), and many 
subsequent studies, find that E(t) is well-described by a random walk; some variants of 
this model use low-order autoregressive processes (UK Government Actuary 2001).  The 
model in Equation 1 and a stochastic model for E(t) are fitted to some span of historical 
data. Starting with known mortality rates in a launch year, one can then generate an 
infinity of forecasts for subsequent years: first project a sample path w of the residual 
process, say E(t,w) for each forecast year t, and then use (1) to compute a corresponding   4
forecast M(x,t,w). The probability distribution of the sample paths E(t,w) can be derived 
from the fitted model (analytically or by simulation) and this yields the probability 
distribution of M(x,t,w). Finally, these forecasts of central death rates are converted to 
age-specific probabilities of death using standard demographic methods. 
Several recent studies have tested and extended the Lee-Carter method. The 
original method has been simplified slightly (Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe 2000), tested using 
historical data and found accurate (Lee and Miller 2000), modified slightly for particular 
countries (Booth, Maindonald, and Smith 2002), better algorithms have been developed 
to guarantee smoothness and to generate optimal forecast models for the E(t) process 
(Hyndman and Booth 2006), and alternative models for E(t) have been estimated and 
tested (UK Government Actuary 2001). The largest systematic application of the Lee-
Carter method has been done by the European DEMWEL (demographic uncertainty and 
the sustainability of social welfare systems) project, covering 19 countries in and 
neighboring the EU; these results are soon to be published. A recently proposed new 
method to forecast mortality applies the extrapolative insight of the Lee-Carter method to 
the age distribution of deaths (Bongaarts 2005); the latter has not been tested against the 
Lee-Carter method. The power of the Lee-Carter result is that the linearity of the 
mortality trend in Equation 1 is revealed by an analysis of the variance in the data, and is 
not imposed. Most alternatives, including the Bongaarts approach, assert a model and fit 
its parameters; there has not been much systematic comparison of competing models.  
Figure 1 shows forecasts of life expectancy at birth (derived by the Lee-Carter 
method) in the United States for both sexes combined, with a launch date in 2001. These 
are 100-year forecasts—it is a brave assumption that the model will hold for a century, 
but the model does accurately describe the past seven decades of mortality experience. 
The forecast is displayed as a set of three lines—the lowest indicates the 2.5 percentile 
level of the forecast in each year, meaning that the probability that the life expectancy 
falls below that lowest line in any year is 2.5 percent. The middle and upper lines are the 
median (50th percentile) and the 97.5 percentile. Thus, this forecast provides a range of 
outcomes that are predicted to contain the future life expectancy with high probability. In 
addition, this method provides any desired number of sample paths of forecast mortality 
rates, and in a simulation, these sample paths will have a probability distribution that is   5
reflected in the prediction intervals shown in Figure 1. Note the 95 percent prediction 
interval for life expectancy is 2.5 years wide after 25 years and five years wide after 50 
years. The median life expectancy forecast 100 years out is about 87 years; by way of 
comparison, the life expectancies in both Japan and Sweden today are over 85 years.  
 
Fertility 
Fertility is described by age-specific birth rates per person per year for women between 
(usually) ages 15 and 50. The sum of the age-specific fertility rates over the reproductive 
ages is the total fertility rate (TFR). The most noticeable empirical fact about fertility in 
the past half-century or so is that it has varied enormously over the years. From the 1950s 
to the 1970s many industrialized countries experienced first a boom and then a bust in 
TFR, leading to large baby booms. Fertility change in recent decades in many 
industrialized countries has put a dent in a long-held belief that TFR should stabilize at or 
close to the population replacement value of 2.05. Among the rich industrialized 
countries, the United States now stands out with a relatively high (though below 
replacement) fertility that has held stable for over a decade; France is not far different. 
Virtually all other rich industrialized countries have experienced declines in fertility to 
TFR levels well below replacement. Although demographers have argued that this 
decline is a temporary consequence of much-delayed childbearing, TFR levels have 
stayed low for several years, and there seem to be no reasons to expect a sizeable rebound 
(Lesthaege and Willems 1999). Economists have advanced endogenous theories of 
fertility that predict swings in fertility in response to changing population composition, 
most famously Easterlin’s (1976) cohort size story for the United States, but these have 
found little empirical support and do not seem useful in a serious forecasting model.  
The volatility of fertility over time means that, in contrast to what we know about 
mortality, we do not have a strong trend to exploit in making forecasts. However, the age 
pattern of fertility (i.e., the relative, as opposed to absolute, fertility of different ages) 
changes relatively slowly over time, even though the levels (TFR) can change relatively 
rapidly over time. In making a forecast, it seems sensible to expect that past volatility in 
fertility is likely to continue in the coming decades. Given this state of understanding, 
Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) proposed a stochastic model of fertility that is conceptually   6
similar to the Lee-Carter mortality model but has very different dynamics. The model 
involves two equations, 
 
F(x,t)  = A(x) + B(x) F(t),                                                 (Equation 2) 
 
F(t) = F* + c(F(t-1) – F*) + u(t) + d u(t-1)                       (Equation 3) 
 
Equation 3 is a stochastic model for fertility F(x,t) of age x in year t, A(x) and 
B(x) are constant age-specific schedules; the level of fertility is governed by the time-
factor F(t) and the constant F*, and the u(t) are stochastic innovations. Equation 2 takes 
the output from Equation 3 and translates it into fertility change. A key assumption in this 
model is that the expected value of the TFR will converge over time to a specified value 
F*. This is a subjective assumption made in all long-run fertility forecasts that I am aware 
of; Tuljapurkar and Boe (1997) examine the consequences of assuming that the long-run 
mean, F*, is drawn from a prior distribution that reflects our uncertainty about long-run 
trends. We estimate the fertility model starting with an a priori specification of the long 
run constraint, F*, and historical data. Just as with mortality, this estimation process 
yields a forecast engine that generates sample paths, F(x,t,w), of age-specific fertility 
over time. An alternative approach to forecasting fertility (Alho and Spencer 1997) uses a 
more flexible parameterization of the stochastic process that generates uncertainty over 
time, but yields similar qualitative predictions.  
Figure 2 displays probabilistic forecasts of TFR for the United States with a 
launch date of 2003. As with the life expectancy forecasts in Figure 1, the plot displays 
several forecast lines: shown here are five annual percentile bounds ranging from a 2.5 
percent low to a 97.5 percent high. In contrast with Figure 1, in which mortality forecasts 
display a modest rate of increase in uncertainty with forecast horizon, the uncertainty 
range for TFR in Figure 2 rises extremely rapidly with forecast horizon. It is important to 
note that any actual forecast will not follow the percentile lines, but will fluctuate over 
time between the highest and lowest percentiles. It is also worth pointing out that the 2.5 
percentile of projected TFR approaches about 1.0, a value close to that currently observed 
in South Korea, Italy, and several other countries, whereas the 97.5 percentile of   7
projected TFR approaches about 3, a value substantially below United States TFR at the 
peak of the baby boom. Thus, the uncertainty shown in Figure 3 may be high, but is 
certainly consistent with historical experience. 
 
Migration 
This is the final component of vital rates and is driven largely by policy so that it does not 
make much sense to model the historical dynamics. For United States forecasts, we adopt 
a scenario method and use (with equal probability) high-medium-low immigration 
alternatives in line with either the United States Census Bureau or the Social Security 
Administration. The medium scenario is simply a continuation of recent past patterns and 
includes both legal and illegal migrants. 
 
3. POPULATION PROJECTIONS 
 
Given stochastic models for mortality and fertility, as well as migration scenarios, we 
start with the population in a launch year and generate a large number of sample paths of 
the vital rates and then corresponding sample paths of population forecasted by age and 
sex over time. Using a large number of sample paths (several thousand) allows us to 
estimate prediction intervals that contain any desired probability for population numbers 
and ratios. It is worth noting that, in general, the forecast uncertainty obtained using 
stochastic methods is much wider than the uncertainty indicated by typical scenario 
forecasts.  
The effects of combining stochastic projections of mortality, fertility, and 
immigration into a population forecast for the United States are illustrated by considering 
several aspects of the projected population. A much broader set of forecasts for the G-7 
countries is presented and discussed in Tuljapurkar, Anderson, and Li (2001). Figure 3 
displays percentile prediction intervals for United States total population starting in 2003. 
Note that the uncertainty in the forecast increases with the forecast horizon, as indicated 
by the growing width of the 95 percent prediction interval relative to the median 
forecast—for total population the 95 percent prediction interval is about 20 percent of the 
median forecast after 25 years and increases to 40 percent after 50 years.    8
Figure 4 displays probability percentiles for projections of the old-age 
dependency ratio (population over 65 divided by population 20 to 64). The size of this 
old age dependency ratio is a key determinant of the balance of flows in any transfer 
system for old age populations, whether for pensions or health care. As is well known, 
the net balance of payments in any such transfer system depends on a product of two 
ratios: the dependency ratio and the ratio of per-capita transfer payments to per-capita 
receipts. The projected dependency ratio has small uncertainty until 2030 because most 
of the change in this ratio until then is due to the aging of the baby boom. Note that the 
aging of the baby boom will, with near-certainty, increase the dependency ratio from its 
2003 value of about 0.2 to a value of 0.35 by 2030. The prediction intervals for the 
dependency ratio are not as wide as for total population; the 95 percent prediction interval 
in Figure 3 is about 0.1 of the median projection after 25 years and just over 0.2 after 50 
years. It is striking that even after the baby boom has largely passed, from 2050 onwards, 
the probability that the dependency ratio will fall below 0.35 is only about 1/6—a striking 
result given the large uncertainty about the predictions.  
Figures 5, 6, and 7 display the uncertainty differently, in terms of population 
pyramids shown at 5, 25, and 50 year forecast horizons. Each figure shows a standard 
population pyramid with age groups arranged vertically for ages up to 105 years—for 
simplicity, I show the total population at each age and do not distinguish the two sexes. 
For each pyramid, the colors indicate percentiles at 2.5 percent (yellow), 50 percent 
(blue), and 97.5 percent (red) for the forecasted population in each age interval. Observe 
that the largest numerical uncertainty is at the younger ages and is driven by the 
substantial uncertainty about fertility that is illustrated in Figure 2. As we move further 
out in time, from 5 to 25 to 50 years, the uncertainty band due to fertility at the younger 
ages moves up the pyramid. The uncertainty in mortality projections, shown by the 
multicolored bands at the highest ages, is modest by comparison to the uncertainty in 
fertility, although it is not in fact trivial in absolute terms. The pattern of growth of 
uncertainty in these pyramids corresponds directly with the growth of uncertainty shown 
for the old-age dependency ratio in Figure 4—that ratio becomes increasingly uncertain 
as the number of working age people becomes uncertain, i.e., at a time horizon greater 
than 20 years.   9
These stochastic forecasts give us a complete set of probabilistic projections of 
population number and composition over time. Since the method generates a probability 
distribution over sample paths (i.e., possible futures), there is complete consistency of the 
prediction probabilities for numbers in various age segments (e.g., children or retirees) 
with prediction probabilities for ratios such as the old-age dependency ratio. 
 
4. PENSION SYSTEMS AND RISK 
 
The approach we take to model pension systems and other fiscal expenditures (Lee and 
Tuljapurkar 2001; Tuljapurkar, Anderson, and Lee 2001) builds on the work of the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) actuaries in the United States, but is simpler in that we do 
not disaggregate as much as they are required to do. We follow SSA in modeling both 
disability and old-age support to produce a model of the United States OASDI system. 
The analytical structure is straightforward—we project labor force participation rates, 
productivity growth, real interest rates, and returns on the stock market (the S&P 500) 
using multivariate autoregressive models that test for correlations between the series. The 
economic models are estimated using historical data in conjunction with expert opinion 
where necessary—for example, we constrain the long-run behavior of real interest rate 
and labor force participation rates. These models are used to generate stochastic sample 
paths for the economic variables by Monte Carlo simulation. To complete the model, we 
need tax schedules that determine payments into the system and benefit schedules that 
determine payments out of the system. We take tax and benefit schedules to be given by 
existing law, including the indexation of wages for the computation of benefits, and the 
indexation of benefits. We follow SSA in using historical data to estimate retirement 
patterns, in particular the fractions of each cohort that opt to receive benefits at different 
ages in the retirement window. We also follow SSA assumptions concerning behavioral 
responses to planned changes in retirement age and incentives.  
The core of our model tracks the balance B(t,w) in the Social Security trust fund 
on every sample path using our forecast of economic and demographic variables, 
   10
B(t,w) = (1 + r(t,w))*B(t-1,w) + {Tax receipts t-1,w} – {Benefits paid t-1,w}               
(Equation 4) 
 
Given a launch year in which we know the holdings of the fund, and some 
forecast horizon, we employ the stochastic population projections to generate a sample 
path of future population by age and sex in each year, and the economic models to 
generate a sample path for each of interest rate, labor force participation, wages, taxes, 
beneficiary status, and benefit payment schedules by age in each year. The latter 
schedules are applied to the projected population to generate the flows on the right side of 
Equation (4). Thus, the final output is a sample path of the flows into and out of the trust 
fund, as well as the level of the fund itself. The resulting set of forecast sample paths can 
be used to assess the state of the system. To explore the effects of privatization, we use 
our joint stochastic model of interest rates and the rate of return on the S&P 500 index of 
equities. For any particular privatization scheme, we modify Equation (4) appropriately 
to incorporate both risky and risk-free components of the fund. 
The way in which we use these projections is to ask: given some fiscal quantity, 
what is its predicted probability distribution over time? An illustration is given in Figure 
8, which describes the probability distribution of the projected actuarial balance under 
current law. This is a summary measure that can be interpreted as the additional tax—as a 
percentage of income that would balance the flows in Equation 4 over a specified time 
horizon. The histogram shown in Figure 8 indicates the distribution of projected actuarial 
balances for the United States OASDI over a 75-year horizon. The vertical lines indicate 
the SSA low, medium, and high actuarial balances. What is striking is that even with the 
substantial uncertainty in economic and demographic variables, there is a projected 
probability of over 50 percent that the additional tax would lie between 1 percent and 3 
percent. In addition, the probability that fortuitous combinations of future conditions 
(e.g., higher than expected wage growth, high interest rates, high fertility) will keep the 
actuarial balance at or above zero is only about 0.05. The probabilistic approach gives us 
a nuanced understanding of how economic and demographic changes affect the system 
over time, and also gives us the odds are that they will generate particular outcomes.   11
Another, and possibly more important, application of this model is to explore the 
impact of policy changes on particular outcomes of interest. To model a policy change, 
say an increase in the normal retirement age (NRA), requires that we incorporate not 
simply a shift in benefit schedules, but also any resulting shift in behavior. Thus, an 
increase in the NRA may change the probabilities with which people opt to claim benefits 
at different ages, their labor force participation rates, and also payouts from the disability 
program. We proceed by incorporating the responses or mechanisms predicted by other 
models (behavioral, endogenous economic, empirical) to provide information on such 
shifts. Our modeling approach would also allow us to incorporate uncertainty about these 
responses although we have not done so. 
I provide two illustrations of the analysis of policy options based on Anderson, 
Tuljapurkar, and Lee (2003). In these examples, I focus on the solvency of the trust fund 
as a criterion of interest; this is not the most important criterion but is simply convenient 
for illustrative purposes. Solvency simply tells us whether in any given year, t, the 
balance in Equation 4 is positive. The probability of solvency in any future year, t, is 
found directly by counting the fraction of sample paths, w for which {B(t,w) >0}, and the 
answer will clearly depend on the time horizon, here indicated by t. In the illustration that 
follows, I use a time horizon of 50 years and examine the probability that the fund is 
solvent in each of those 50 years. Under current law, it is well known that the fund will 
almost certainly be insolvent before these 50 years are up, so we will use the models to 
ask what happens to the probability of solvency if we change policy in specified ways. 
As a first example, we ask how solvency is affected by a combination of two 
policy changes to be implemented immediately—one is to raise the taxes collected for 
Social Security, the other is to invest some fraction of the trust fund (collectively) in the 
S&P 500 index. Figure 9 shows how the probability of solvency changes in response. The 
current situation is indicated by the origin where we have neither additional taxes nor 
investment, and shows the probability of solvency to be essentially zero. If we move 
along either of the horizontal axes, we are tracking either an increase in tax by the 
specified percentage, or the immediate investment of a specified proportion of the trust 
fund surplus into equities. As we move into the interior, we are tracking the joint effect of 
both kinds of change. An interesting feature of the plot is the synergy between the two   12
policy variables. A tax increase of 1 percent by itself raises solvency probability from 
near zero to about 40 percent. If we also invested 20 percent of the trust fund in the stock 
market, we get up to a solvency probability of about 60 percent. 
As a second illustration, we again consider the probability of solvency over 75 
years, but examine the effect of a different pair of policies. One policy, as before, is to 
raise the taxes going into Social Security, the other is to increase the normal retirement 
age (NRA) to 67, 68, or 69 on a more accelerated schedule. The final NRA values and the 
target dates for their achievement are shown in the figure. In the baseline case at the 
origin we have current law taking us to an NRA of 67 in 2022. Other possibilities shown 
are achieved by a steady increase over the periods indicated starting immediately. The 
results of these changes on solvency over 50 years are shown in Figure 10. Here again we 
observe synergies between the two policy options and they are even bigger than those in 
Figure 9. A tax increase of 1 percent by itself raises solvency probability from near zero 
to about 40 percent. If we also increase the NRA steadily up to age 69 by 2024, we get up 
to a solvency probability of about 80 percent. 
The analyses illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 can be conducted for other objective 
functions under other policy scenarios. These analyses reveal unexpected synergies 
between policy options and also the importance of the timing of policy change. The 
analyses also highlight the fact that many policy options can improve the fiscal situation 
of the OASDI program but still leave us with a substantial probability that some target, 
such as solvency, will not be achieved. Thus, we can rank alternative policies in terms of 
the probabilities that they will achieve some set of targets. 
 
5. MODELING HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND MODELING POLICY 
 
Public health care spending can be modeled in much the same way as we model the 
OASDI system. The key step is to determine age-schedules of expenditure by sex and to 
describe how these schedules will evolve over time. As the population ages, we expect a 
long-run shift in the age profiles themselves—the large expenditures that characterize the 
last two years of life will progressively occur at later ages. In addition, and this is critical, 
we must project changes in the absolute level of expenditure at all ages over time. The   13
latter is well known to be driven by cost inflation in the short run, but may also change 
over time in response to trends in health. It is easy to see that if costs increase faster than 
wages then the transfers needed to pay for these costs must also increase, and eventually 
any such system will be unsustainable. Forecasts usually analyze alternative long run 
scenarios of change while incorporating historical volatility as we did with our models of 
fertility. Lee and Tuljapurkar (2000) discuss and illustrate these and more general aspects 
of the forecasting of fiscal expenditures for a variety of government programs. 
I argue that probabilistic methods provide a rich and necessary tool for the 
analysis of public policy, especially in settings that involve intergenerational transfers 
and, thus, require analyses over long time horizons. In such settings, uncertainty will 
usually grow over time and policies must be evaluated in terms of their probability of 
achieving targets of various kinds (Tuljapurkar 1997; Anderson, Tuljapurkar, and Lee 
2003). The methods described here provide a natural setting in which to evaluate multiple 
policy objectives and also to identify policy combinations that are optimal in the sense 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
Figure 1. Life expectancy at birth (sexes combined) in the United States forecast using 
the Lee-Carter method. The three lines shown are the 2.5, 50, and 97.5 percentile lines of 
the probability forecast. 
 
Figure 2. Total fertility rate in the United States forecast using the stochastic model 
described in the text. The lines shown are the 2.5, 16.7, 50, 83.3, and 97.5 percentile lines 
of the probability forecast. 
 
Figure 3. Probabilistic forecast of the total population of the United States. The lines 
shown are the 2.5, 16.7, 50, 83.3, and 97.5 percentile lines of the probability forecast. 
 
Figure 4. Probabilistic forecast of the old-age dependency ratio of the United States. The 
lines shown are the 2.5, 16.7, 50, 83.3, and 97.5 percentile lines of the probability 
forecast. 
 
Figure 5. Age pyramid drawn from a probabilistic forecast of United States population at 
a time horizon of ten years. The bars show total population by age, the inner and outer 
pyramids contain 95 percent of the probability projected. 
 
Figure 6. Age pyramid drawn from a probabilistic forecast of United States population at 
a time horizon of twenty-five years. The bars show total population by age, the inner and 
outer pyramids contain 95 percent of the probability projected. 
 
Figure 7. Age pyramid drawn from a probabilistic forecast of United States population at 
a time horizon of fifty years. The bars show total population by age, the inner and outer 
pyramids contain 95 percent of the probability projected. 
 
Figure 8. Histogram of summarized actuarial balance in a stochastic projection of the 
United States OASDI system. The balance is computed over a 75-year time horizon. 
 
Figure 9. Probability of solvency of the OASDI trust fund over a 50-year period in 
response to tax increases and investment of some fraction of the trust fund balance in 
equities. 
 
Figure 10. Probability of solvency of the OASDI trust fund over a 50-year period in 







   17









   18
 














































FIGURE 3: Probabilistic Forecast of the Total Population of the United States 











































































































FIGURE 5: Age Pyramid Drawn from a Probabilistic Forecast of United States 


























FIGURE 6: Age Pyramid Drawn from a Probabilistic Forecast of United States 




























FIGURE 7: Age Pyramid Drawn from a Probabilistic Forecast of United States 





























FIGURE 8: Histogram of Summarized Actuarial Balance in a Stochastic Projection 
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 -5.00     -1.89      0.38
75-year summarized actuarial balance












FIGURE 9: Probability of Solvency of the OASDI Trust Fund Over a 50-Year 
Period in Response to Tax Increases and Investment of Some Fraction of the Trust 






























































FIGURE 10: Probability of Solvency of the OASDI Trust Fund over a 50-Year 
Period in Response to Tax Increases and More Rapid Increases in the Normal 
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